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OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS J. RICHINS and
SUESANN RICHINS,
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i
]i

DELBERT CHIPMAN & SONS CO.,
INC. and D. RAY CHIPMAN,
individually,
Defendants-Appellants,

Case No. 90-0134-CA
Priority 16

;

vs.

]

RICHARD PORTER and
KENNETH PORTER,

;

Defendants-Appellees,
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying
Defendants' Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc. and D. Ray Chipman
(hereinafter "Chipman") Motion to Set Aside, or to Refoann the
Stipulation and Judgment under Rule 60(a) and (b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the Court's inherent powers?
STANDARD OF APPET.T.A'TO RRVTTTO
Chipman has misstated the standard of review by asserting
the standard to be to "review the lower Court's decision only for
correctness, without according any deference thereto."
1

The true

standard of review is that delineated in Laub v. South Central Utah
Telephone Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982) at page 1306s
A motion to modify a final judgment is
addressed to the discretion of the Trial
Court, the exercise of which must be based on
sound legal principles in light of all
relevant
circumstances•
The
Court's
determination may be reversed only upon a
showing that this discretion was abused.
This is in accord with the later case of Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d
1114 (Utah App. 1989) where this Court declared at page 1117:
The trial Court is afforded broad discretion
in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment
under
Utah
R.Civ.P.
60(b),
and
its
determination will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., Katz
v.
Pierce,
732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986); Russell
v.
Martell,
681 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah 1984).
STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUE
Rule 60(a) and (b) is the only Rule of Civil Procedure
which is determinative of the sole issue of this appeal. Chipman,
in the Appellant's Brief, has set forth said Rule 60(a) and (b) in
its entirety and hence Plaintiffs-Appellees, Dennis J. Richins and
Suesann Richins (hereinafter -Richins-) will not duplicate said
recitation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richins filed a Complaint alleging that a sale and lease
agreement had been entered into between Richins and Chipman.

At

trial on December 21, 1987, Richins presented their evidence and
rested their case in chief.

The parties, during and after the

lunch break, began to negotiate a settlement.
2

The negotiations

were conducted between the parties' counsel and Dr. Osguthorpe (a
confidant of Chipman) and lasted for over one and one-half hours.
The parties reached an agreed upon stipulation and settlement. The
stipulation

was

read

into

the

record

and

later

a

written

Stipulation and Judgment was executed by the attorneys for each of
the parties and by the Court.
Fifteen months later, after substantial payments and
performance by all parties had transpired, Chipman filed a Motion
to Set Aside or to Reform the Stipulation and Judgment.
Disposition in the Lower Court
The lower Court granted Richins' Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction on the grounds that Chipman's motions were not
filed within three months of the date of the judgment as required
by Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or October 4,
1989.

Chipman appealed from the October 4, 1989 order.
Statement of Facts
Chipman's Statement of Facts are so twisted by argument,

accusation, innuendo and distortion that Richins is compelled to
give an accurate recitation of the facts.
On or about October 30, 1986, Richins and Chipman entered
into an agreement wherein Chipman sold to Richins certain grazing
permits and a 5-year lease with two option periods totalling an
additional 5-year period (R.2, 7-19, Ex. 9, R.526-529).

On April

27, 1987, Chipman sold and leased part of the same grazing permits
and

ground

to

Defendants

Richard

(hereinafter "Porter") (R.144-163).
3

Porter

and

Kenneth

Porter

The sale agreement to Porter from Chipman contains the
following specific reference at paragraph 1.4:
Section 1.4.
Porter acknowledges that
other parties make claim to the fact that one
or more of the grazing permits being sold
hereunder have previously been sold to them,
and that litigation may arise asserting that
fact.
In the event that such litigation
results in the loss of the grazing permits by
Porter, Chipman agrees to refund all sums paid
for the same by Porter. (R.148)
A Restraining Order was obtained and Porter stipulated to
remove their sheep from the grazing permits and leased ground by
June 9, 1987 (R.62-64).
A Protective Order was entered so that Richins could make
the payments, under the sale and lease agreement, into Court
without prejudice to any party (R.133-135).
Trial was held on December 21, 1987, before the Honorable
Boyd L. Park (R.197).

Richins presented their case in chief and

the Court recessed at 11:30 a.m. (R.198). The parties' counsel and
Dr. Osguthorpe, the confidant of Chipman, began negotiations for a
settlement

(R.198, 339-345, 381-388).

The parties reached a

settlement and the stipulation was read into the record (R.504515).

The Court reconvened at 2:20 p.m. to hear the stipulation

(R.198).

Subsequently,

the

parties

entered

into

a written

Stipulation and Judgment on Stipulation (R.202-209, 313-329).
The Stipulation was explained to Chipman (contrary to the
assertion by Chipman) and to Dr. Osguthorpe, who advised Chipman to
settle (R.512-513, 340-342, 381-388). The written Stipulation and
Judgment conforms with the oral stipulation and was approved by
4

Chipman's counsel after a careful review of the oral stipulation to
the written Stipulation and Judgment (R.387).
offices

of

Chipman's

his

attorney

almost

counsel prepared

daily

Chipman visited the

after

the settlement.

a schedule of payments under the

Stipulation and finally gave Chipman the transcript (or a copy
thereof) of the Stipulation to keep his memory refreshed of the
terms (R.387).
Letters, detailing performance under the Stipulation and
Judgment, have been sent to Chipman from and after the Judgment
(R.331-334). Chipman caused to be sent a "Notice of Cancellation"
dated April 22, 1988, which Notice referenced the terms and
conditions

of

the written

Stipulation

and

Judgment

and

the

provisions as modified therein (R.335).
Chipman filed the Motion to Set Aside or to Reform the
Judgment on March 9, 1989 (R.214).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Chipman's Motion to set aside or to reform properly falls
under Rule 60(b)(1) and not under Rule 60(b)(5), (6) or (7).
Chipman asserts that he did not understand the Stipulation, did not
consent to the Stipulation and/or was not adequately represented by
counsel.
The Stipulation was read into the record, concurred in by
Chipman, Dr. Osguthorpe (Chipman's confidant), and was signed by
counsel, who reviewed the written Stipulation to be sure it
conformed with the oral Stipulation.
5

Chipman relied upon the stipulation, sent notices which
referred to the terms of the stipulation and received benefits in
excess of $120,000 under the stipulation.
Chipman waited for 15 months before seeking to set aside
and/or reform the Judgment.

The period of 15 months is too long

under any provision of Rule 60(b).
POINT II
Rule 60(a) is not applicable since Chipman's Motion is
not "clerical" as opposed to "judicial." See Lindsay v. Atkin, 682
P.2d 401 (Utah 1984) and Moore's Federal Practice, Second Edition,
Vol. 6A 9 60.06[1] wherein the authorities make the distinction
that 60(a) is not available to "correct errors of a serious or
substantial nature . . . ."
POINT III
The Trial Court refused to exercise any "inherent power"
to set aside or reform the Judgment in light of Rule 60(b)(1) and
Chipman's failure to make a timely motion.
Any exercise of the "inherent power" of the Court would
be an abuse of discretion and constitute the Trial Court rewriting
a new contract, contrary to the terms of the Stipulation for
Settlement and Judgment.

Chipman's request to set aside and/or

reform the Judgment is violative of the clear mandate of Herrin v.
Herrin, 595 P.2d 1152 (Montana 1979), which mandate was approved by
the Utah Supreme Court in Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah
1987), wherein the Court declared that:
While a Court may intercept contracts . . . a
Court may not make a new one for the parties
6

and may not alter or amend one which the
parties themselves have made.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CHIPMAN'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE OR TO
REFORM FALLS UNDER RULE 60(b)(1) AND
NOT UNDER RULE 60(b) (5) , (6) OR (7).
The pertinent portions of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., provide
as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
Court may in the furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(5) the judgment is void; (6) the
judgment had been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it
is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application;
or (7) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.
The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months
after
the
judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken.
Chipman, on appeal, asserts that Chipman's motion falls under
number 5 or 6 or 7 by declaring:
Chipman did not enter into any agreement at
all.
Mr. Chipman did not understand what
Richins was trying to impose upon him and his
corporation. He did not agree to anything,
(emphasis supplied, page 9 of Appellant's
Brief).
The

foregoing

"mistake."

language

is simply a vivid

illustration of a

Mistake is defined, in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th

Edition).:

7

Some unintentional act, omission, or error
arising from ignorance, surprise, imposition,
or misplaced confidence.
A mistake exists
when a person, under some erroneous conviction
of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act
which, but for the erroneous conviction, he
would not have done or omitted. It may arise
either
from
unconsciousness,
ignorance,
forgetfulness,
imposition,
or
misplaced
confidence.
Mistake is further defined in 54 Am.Jur.2d § 8 Mistake, page 454:
"Mistake of law" has been defined as a
mistaken opinion or inference arising from an
imperfect or incorrect exercise of the
judgment upon the facts as they really are.
Such a mistake has been said to occur where a
party, having knowledge of the facts, is
ignorant of the legal consequences of his
conduct or reaches an erroneous conclusion as
to the effect thereof.
SxrprLse

is defined in 54 Am.Jur.2d § 14, Mistake, page 458:
A man is surprised in whatever is not done
with so much judgment as it ought to be.
Chipman takes the position that he did not understand the

stipulation, did not consent to it, was not adequately represented
by

counsel

when

the

stipulation

was

reached,

and

that

the

stipulation is ambiguous, unfair or inconsistent with the intent of
the parties.
upon

Distilled to its essence, Chipman's motion is based

mistake,

inadvertence

(another

definition

of

mistake),

surprise or excusable neglect, the items listed in Rule 60(b)(1)
and subject to the three month limitation.
When

asked,

in

open

Court,

if

he

understood

stipulation, Mr. Chipman stated:
MR. WOOTTON:
Mr. Chipman you have been in
Court and listened to that stipulation have
you not sir?
8

the

MR. CHIPMAN:
MR. WOOTTON:
record?
MR. CHIPMAN:

What Stipulation.
The one Mr. Brown just stated into the
Well I don't understand it.

MR. WOOTTON: Well have you been in here and
you understand it?
MR. CHIPMAN: I have been in here a long time
and I don't quite understand it but I guess it
is all right.
MR. WOOTTON: All right Mr. Osterthorpe you
are Mr. Chipman's friend?
MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes.
MR. WOOTTON: You have been in the Courtroom
and heard it too?
MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes.
MR. WOOTTON:

And do you think it is reasonable?

MR. OSTERTHORPE: Yes.
(emphasis supplied, R.512-513).
Now, Chipman states in an Affidavit he did not understand or agree
to the Stipulation.

Although it appears that Chipman has merely

changed his mind about the Stipulation and is urging the Court to
sanction his whims, it should be kept in mind

that Mr. Wootton,

Chipman's attorney of record, did, in fact, agree to and Mr.
Wootton did

sign the Stipulation

on behalf

of Mr. Chipman.

Judgment was then entered upon the Stipulation.
The changing of Chipman's mind is aptly displayed by
Chipman's Notice of Cancellation, dated April 29, 1988 (R.335),
which provides in pertinent part:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to the
provisions of the Stipulation and Settlement
9

Agreement entered into on December 21, 1987,
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, a lease
payment was due in the maximum amount of
$15,700.00 and a minimum amount of $4,180.00
depending on the status of the Pine Hollow
Grazing Permit, and no such payments have been
received.
Under the provisions of the agreement
entered into as described above, you are
notified that the undersigned lessors exercise
their option to cancel the lease referred to
in the stipulation thirty (30) days from the
date of this notice unless the payment of
$15,700.00 is received within that time if the
Pine Hollow Permit is still in effect, or the
payment of $4,180.00 if the Pine Hollow Permit
is cancelled and evidence of that cancellation
is provided (emphasis supplied).
Mr. Wootton, under oath, declared at pages 382-388:
6.
On the 21st dat (sic) of December
1987, Chipman, Porters, Richins and their
respective counsel entered into discussions
about possible settlement. These discussions
lasted for at least one and one-half hours or
more.
7.
Chipman had a confidant, Doctor
Osguthorpe, and the discussions, proposals and
counter proposals were all discussed with
Chipman and Osguthorpe.
8.
Osguthorpe was
of Chipman and affiant
Chipman's behalf.
At
during the discussions
Judgment, there remained
acceptable to Chipman.
were:
a)

there at the request
to be a witness on
some point in time
leading up to the
only two issues not
Tose (sic) issues

A ten year term for the lease;

b)
Allowing up to 100 head of cattle to
be on the ground.
9.
Dr. Osguthorpe, in the presence of
affiant, advised Chipman to accept the 10 year
term and to allow up to 100 head of cattle,
which cattle grazing had been historically
done under Chipman's management.
10

10. Affiant, with Dr. Osguthorpe and
Chipman, discussed and explained at length and
in detail:
a)
The forgiveness of $21,000
payment by way of part of the damages due
Richins;
b)
the reduction of the
annual installment to $19,700;

semi-

c)
the lease would be for a 10year period;
d)
Richins could run up to 100
head of cattle;
e)
there would be payments made to
Porter instead of Chipman for the
purchase price of the two permits;
f)
Porters
would
be
awarded
judgment of $20,000 with no execution on
the Judgment as long as Richins paid
$4,000 per semi-annual payment directly
to Porters;
g)
Richins
would
be
awarded
additional damages to be withheld at the
rate of $2,500 per semi-annual lease
payment;
h)
That
Exhibit
"A" to the
complaint would be rewritten to reflect
the changes agreed to and attached to the
Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment;
i)
Porters,
upon
receipt
of
$30,000 of the $54,000 which had been
paid into the Court, would convey and
assign over to Richins both of the
permits which Chipman sold to Porters;
j)
Chipman;

$15,700

was

to

be

paid

to

k)
$4,300 would be paid as a prepayment to Porters on the remaining
balance for the two permits;
1)
there was the possibility that
the Pine Hollow permit would be cancelled
11

(sic) by the Forest Department. If the
Pine Hollow permit was not cancelled
(sic), Richins would pay Chipman for the
Pine Hollow last;
m)
if Pine Hollow was cancelled
(sic), there would be an offset of
$11,520
(anually), which
would
be
deducted for the grazing year (Fall 1987
and Spring of 1988) from the April 1988
payment;
n)
if the Pine Hollow permit was
only partially cancelled (sic), there
would be a pro-rata reduction on the
basis of $9.60 per head;
o)
Chipman
was
given
until
December 15, 1989 to protest, appeal or
take whatever other steps he desired to
make available to Richins the Pine Hollow
permit, and he was so advised by Affiant.
He did not do so.
p)
Richins may pay direct the
lease payments to BLM, State Land, U.S.
Forest and/or private third party lessors
and deduct said payments from the $19,700
semi-annual payments;
q)
in the event that the U.S.
Forest Department cancelled (sic) the
entire Pine Hollow permit, there would be
a further reduction of the semi-annual
lease payment of $5,760 for the remianing
(sic) period;
r)
there would be a written
Stipulation for Settlement to be prepared
by Mr. Brown;
s)
Chipman could terminate the
lease if Richins did not pay the lease
payment timely, but after a 30-day notice
in writing was sent to Richins.
11. At the conclusion of going over the
elements in paragraph 10 above with Dr.
Osguthorpe, Dr. Osguthorpe advised Chipman to
take the proposed offer of settlement.
Chipman then told affiant "settle."
12

12• Affiant was authorized "to settle"
the case upon the terms of paragraph 10.

16. After the hearing was concluded,
affiant ordered a copy of the transcript from
the Court Reporter, Mr. Tatton. The purpose
of this transcript was to verify the formal
written Stipulation and Judgment conformed
with the oral stipulation and affiant's
understanding of the Stipulation and the terms
discussed at length with Chipman and Dr.
Osguthorpe.
17. Chipman visited affiant at his
office almost daily following the settlement
and affiant on those occasions discussed at
length the terms and conditions of the
Stipulation and showed to Chipman the
transcript. At one point in time affiant gave
the transcript to Chipman to keep and to
refresh his memory about the terms. Affiant
was asked by Chipman to prepare a schedule of
payments Chipman would receive which affiant
did.
18. Affiant
compared
the
written
Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment with
the transcript and found the Judgment to
conform to the transcript of the oral
stipulation.
19. Affiant prepared, at the request of
Chipman, the Notice of Cancellation dated
April 29, 1988, and had a lengthy discussion
with Chipman on that occasion and again
reviewed the terms of the Judgment and
Stipulation.
The record is CONSPICUOUS BY THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION THAT MR.
WOOTTON WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO SETTLE.

The law is aptly stated in

Snyder v. Tompkins, 579 P.2d 994 (Wash. 1978):
The law favors the amicable settlement of
disputes, and is inclined to view them with
finality.
An agreement arrived at in this
matter is binding on the parties and will not
be reviewed on appeal unless the party
contesting it can show that the stipulation
13

was a product of fraud or that the attorney
over-reached his authority . . . .
fOlnce a
client has designated an attorney to represent
him, the Court and other parties to the action
are entitled to rely upon that authority until
the relationship is terminated.
We subscribe to the principle that a person
attempting to dislocate an in-Court settlement
of a claim has the burden of showing that the
agreement was a product of fraud or overreaching.

Furthermore, a trial Court's determination
that the parties fully appreciated the terms
of the settlement will not be disturbed where
it is supported by the evidence. Here, the
record supports the Court's finding that Ms.
Tompkins was fully apprised of the settlement
terms
immediately
before
her
attorney
presented them in open Court. Nevertheless,
she voluntarily absented herself from the
Courtroom
during
the
oral
stipulation,
indicating that she acquiesced
in the
settlement.
Id. at 998, 999 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
The reasons set forth in the Motion of Chipman are all
reasons set forth under paragraph 1 of Rule 60(b).

Chipman has

attempted to bootstrap themselves into a posture of paragraphs (5),
(6) or (7) because of the expiration of the time element that is
required under Rule 60(b)(1) . However, Utah law is very clear that
one cannot utilize subdivision 60(b)(5), (6) or (7) to circumvent
the 3 month filing period if the bases for the relief from the
Judgment

is based upon mistake or inadvertence

or excusable

neglect.

See Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977), Calder

Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982) and Laub v. South
Central Utah Telephone Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982).
14

It is absolutely jurisdictional to present the reasons
that are presented in this Motion by Chipman within three months.
If the Motion is not filed within three months, it is untimely and
this Court does not have jurisdiction to allow even a hearing.

In

Laub, supra, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the Judgment was
in error by the following language found at page 1308:
In view of the fact that Plaintiff's judgment
should never have included the previous
compensated damages, defendant South Central's
own mistake or neglect is the cause of
plaintiff's partial double recovery.
As
discussed above, South Central could have
prevented this undesirable result by timely
motion to strike the improper portion of the
prayer for relief or to amend the judgment.
This failure to act seasonably falls more
accurately under subdivision (1) of Rule 60(b)
allowing relief from a judgment rendered by
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect."
Chipman argues that he had ineffective counsel because
his trial counsel was purportedly under the influence of alcohol.
The basis for the assertion of trial counsel being under the
influence of alcohol would have been known on December 21, 1987,
i.e., the allegations set forth in Chipman's Affidavit (R.220-221)
and Dr. Osguthorpe's affidavit (R.226).

First, Chipman has not

denied to date that trial counsel had authority to settle. Second,
the trial counsel affirmatively asserts he had authority to settle.
Third, the Stipulation and Judgment, signed by counsel for Chipman,
was executed after comparing the same to the transcript of the oral
stipulation.

Fourth, the terms and provisions of the transcript

and the written Stipulation and Judgment were reviewed with Chipman
on numerous occasions before March 1988. Fifth, the "cancellation
15

provisions" are found in paragraph 3.1 of the Exhibit "A" to the
Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment
DOCUMENT CHIPMAN SAYS HE NEVER SAW.

(R.313-329), THE VERY

However, the April 29, 1988,

Notice of Cancellation prepared by trial counsel for Chipman refers
to this provision (R.335).

There is no objective showing that

Chipman had ineffective counsel.
Effective counsel is not a constitutional right in a
civil action.

Assuming, arguendo, that counsel was ineffective,

that simply puts the ineffective counsel as "excusable neglect."
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d
723 (Utah 1983) at page 728, declared as follows:
Val complains that his trial counsel argued in
support of Mike's motion for a directed
verdict, and that his counsel failed to make a
motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Val argues
that this act and omission require that he be
granted a new trial. He cites no authority
for this proposition, and with good reason. A
civil action is not reversed because privately
retained counsel was incompetent.
If trial
counsel was indeed incompetent, then Val may
be entitled to seek redress against him in a
separate action.
Chipmanfs assertion that the Stipulation is ambiguous,
inconsistent, unclear, confusing and incomplete to show the lack of
meeting of the minds is without merit.
The allegation that the terms of the Stipulation are so
ambiguous, inconsistent, unclear and confusing again points to the
very issue that it would be a mistake to enter into such a
Stipulation.

Mistake must be brought within three months.

Utah

law is very clear about written contracts in which the Stipulation,
16

by its terms, became.

As stated in Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk,

321 P.2d 221, 7 Utah 2d 163 (1958) at page 166, states:
. . . the fundamental concepts in regard to
contracts: that their purpose is to reduce to
writing the conditions upon which the minds of
the parties have met and to fix their rights
and duties in respect thereto. The intent so
expressed is to be found, if possible, within
the four corners of the instrument itself in
accordance with the ordinary accepted meaning
of the words used . . . . Generally speaking,
neither of the parties, nor the Court has any
right to ignore or modify conditions which are
clearly expressed merely because it may
subject one of the parties to hardship, but
they must be enforced "in accordance with the
intention as manifested by the language used
by the parties to the contract.
That statement was again affirmed by the Court in Jones v. Acme
Building Products, Inc., 450 P.2d 743, 22 Utah 2d 202 (1969), at
page 206.
The Court is not able to rewrite the agreement of the
parties. Our Supreme Court, in a very recent case, LPS Hospital v.
Capital Life Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988), declared at
page 858:
A cardinal rule in construing the contract is
to give effect to the intentions of the
parties and, if possible, these intentions
should be gleaned from an examination of the
text of the contract itself.
The contract itself is the written Stipulation, which is signed by
all parties.

There is no allegation nor any assertion by Chipman

that Mr. Wootton was not authorized to settle.
Our

Supreme

Court

and

Appeals

has

consistently held that a Court cannot rewrite a contract.

The
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the

Court

of

It is not necessary, however, that the
contract itself contain all of the particulars
of the agreement. The crucial factor is that
the parties agreed on the essential elements
of the contract.
In the same opinion, the Court of Appeals cited with approval the
language from the Montana case of Herrin v. Herrin, 595 P.2d 1152,
1155 (Montana 1979):
While a Court may interpret contracts which
are open to interpretation, a Court may not
make a new one for the parties and may not
alter or amend one which the parties
themselves have made.
Chipman

asserts

the

Stipulation

for

Settlement

and

Judgment are so unfair and inequitable as to be unconscionable.
This assertion

is based upon a mistake of entering

into an

unconscionable or inequitable contract. The Utah Supreme Court in
Laub, supra, cited with approval the case of Ackerman v. United
States, 340 U.S. 193, 198, 71 S. Ct. 209, 211, 95 L. Ed. 207
(1950), wherein the United States Supreme Court denied relief under
Rule 60(b) by stating:
Deliberate choices are not to be relieved
from.
Chipman made deliberate choices by agreeing to the Stipulation for
Settlement and Judgment. Chipman acted upon that choice, received
the benefits (payments either directly or for his benefit of over
$120,000), and sought to enforce the very terms of the Stipulation.
He cannot be relieved from such a deliberate choice.
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POINT II
RULE 60(d) IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS
ISSUE.
Rule 60(a), U.R.C.P., provides in pertinent part as
follows:
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or
other parts of the record and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the Court at any time of its own
initiative or on the motion of any party and
after such notice, if any, as the Court orders
. . . .

Rule 60(a) cannot be used as a vehicle to circumvent the time
constraints of 60(b).

The case of Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401

(Utah 1984), is directly on point in the discussion of the breadth
of 60(a), when at page 402 the Court declared:
This Court has differentiated between clerical
errors and judicial errors, stating:
The distinction between a judicial error
and a clerical error does not depend upon
who made it.
Rather, it depends on
whether it was made in rendering the
judgment or in recording
the judgment as
rendered. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 202.
Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 317, 471
P.2d 143, 145 (1970) (emphasis added).
The
correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be
undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the
actual intention of the Court and parties. 6A
Moore's Federal Practice 1J 60.06[1] (2d ed.
1983). Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct
errors of a substantial nature, particularly
where the claim of error is unilateral. The
fact that an intention was subsequently found
to be mistaken would not cause the mistake to
be "clerical." See Bershad v. McDonough, 469
F.2d 1333 (7th Cir.1972).
The unilateral mistake of Chipman is not "clerical."
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The Court in Lindsay, supra, cited with approval Moore's
Federal Practice.

A further look at that authority reveals:

The errors envisioned by Rule 60(a) cover
such things as misprisions, oversights and
omissions, unintended acts or failures to act.
In the interest of justice, and to the end
that the record reflect the actual intention
of the Court and parties, relief from such
minor errors should be freely granted. But it
is clear that errors of a serious or
substantial nature are not included, and thus
Rule 60(a) does not properly apply to action
or non-action that properly reflects the
intention of the parties or the Court.
Moored Federal Practice, Second Edition Vol 6A, 1f 60.06[1], 11 6041 and 1F 60-42.

The distinction is "clerical" versus "intention"

or "judicial."

The unilateral changing of Chipman's mind, or

Chipman's mistake as to their intent, is not an error that falls
under the ambit of Rule 60(a).
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT EXERCISE ANY
INHERENT POWER AND TO DO SO UNDER
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
No one argues that the Court certainly has equitable
jurisdiction to modify its own judgments or orders.

However, the

factual circumstances in this case are so compelling that the Court
cannot and should not set aside the Stipulated Judgment simply
because Chipman changes their minds.
Our Courts have universally
finality to judgments.

recognized the need of

The bases for challenging judgments are

restricted as well as the time frames within which to file such a
challenge.

The Trial Court properly, and within
20

its sound

discretion, ruled that it had no jurisdiction to set aside or
reform the agreed upon and Stipulated judgment.
CONCLUSION
Chipman's Motion is untimely and was properly denied and
stricken since the basis of the Motion was properly under Rule
60(b)(1) and not under Rule 60(b)(5), (6) or (7).
Richins is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under
the provisions of the Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment.
Chipman's appeal should be dismissed and the matter remanded to the
Trial Court for determination of reasonable attorney's fees and
costs to be awarded Richins under the agreement.
DATED this

//

day of September, ^9T97K
& DUNN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

//

day of September,

1990, I caused four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLEES to be served by United States mail, postage
prepaid, to:
George A. Hunt
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P, 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Ralph J. Marsh
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake

jrb\p\0454
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Rule 50, Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury.
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for
any reason ih not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party,
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in
accordance with the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment,
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a
new trial shall be granted.

Rule 59, New trials; amendments of judgment,
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT EISENSTAEDTr
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
Civil No- 860909577PI

vs .
OTIS ELEVATOR,

Judge Frank G* Noel
Defendant.
We, the jury, based upon a preponderance of the
evidence find on the Special Verdict submitted to us as follows:
1.

At the time and place in question and under the

conditions as shown by the evidence, was the defendant, Otis
Elevator, negligent?
Yes

No

If your answer is Yes, go on to Question No. 2.

If your answer

is No, go to Question No. 3.
Vlas such negligence a proximate cause of injury to
*

the plaintiff?
Yes

No

Go on to Question No. 3.

j ~ ;

r\

7''
3.

Did the functioning of the Otis elevator in

question on April 9, 1986 breach the defendant's implied warranty
of merchantability?
IQS"
Yes
l^y

No

If your answer to xsv Yesf go on to Question No. 4.

If your

answer is No, go on to Question No. 5.
4.

Was the defendant's breach of that implied

warranty of merchantability a proximate cause of injury to the
plaintiff?
Yes

\yr

NO

Go on to Question No. 5.
5.

Did the functioning of the Otis elevator in

question on April 9, 1986 breach the defendant's implied warranty
of fitness for particular purpose?
Yes

i^^

No

If your answer is Yes, go on to Question No. 6.

If your answer

is Nof go on to Question No. 7.
6.

Was the defendant's breach of that implied

warranty of fitness for particular purpose a proximate cause of
injury to the plaintiff?

Yes__J/_

No

Go on to Question No. 7.

4\

7.

Was t h e e l e v a t o r i n q u e s t i o n i n a

cotvdLt-iotv v u \ x e ^ s Q a a b l y d a n q e r o u s t o t h e
Ye*

[s^

defective

user?

No

If your answer is Yes, go on Question No. 8.

If your answer is

No, go on to Question No, 9.
8.

Was that defective condition of the elevator in

question a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff?
Ye3

\ y ^

No

Go on to Question No- 9.
9.

If you answered Yes to Questions 1 and 2 or Yes to

Questions Nog• 3 and 4 or Yes to Questions Nos. 5 and 6 or Yes to
Questions Nog• 7 and 8, please answer Question No. 10.

If not,

return this special Verdict to the bailiff now.
10.

What amount would fairly and adequately compensate

the plaintiff for the injuries he sustained as a result of the
accident in question?
Special Damages

$

/ 7 f £f}£

, td

General Damages

$

^^^f00m

^$7 £ £ ^

$ /V,

TOTAL
DA'fED this

/Q

day of July, 1989.

n £
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GORDON K. JENSEN - A4 351
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT EISENSTAEDT,
JUDGMENT ON
THE VERDICT

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 860909577PI

vs.

Judge Frank G. Noel

OTIS ELEVATOR,
Defendant.

This matter was tried to a jury on July 17, 18 and 19,
1989, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding.

Gordon K. Jensen of

Robert J, DeBry and Associates represented the plaintiff.

Bruce

R. Garner of Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson represented the
defendant.

The liability of the defendant was submitted to the

jury on four theories:

Negligence; breach of implied warranty of

merchantability; breach of implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose; and strict products liability.
The jury returned a verdict finding that the defendant
was

not

implied

negligent, but that
warranties

of

the defendant

merchantability

and

had breached
fitness

its

for

a

particular purpose and that the elevator in question was in a
**'\*

defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate user
or consumer and, therefore, liable to the plaintiff under strict
products liability.
The jury further found that these breaches of implied
warranty and the defective condition of the elevator were the
proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.
Based on those

findings of liability and causation

against the defendant, the jury returned the following verdict on
damages:
What

amount

would

fairly

and

adequately

compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he
sustained

as a result of the accident in

question?
Special Damages

$17,250.00

General Damages

5,000 .00

TOTAL

$22,250.00

The verdict was appropriately dated and signed by the
foreperson.

Based upon the Special Verdict of the jury;

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment be
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as
follows:
1.

The

plaintiff

is awarded

judgment

against

the

defendant for special damages in the amount of $17,250.

2

.-'O^'
P, '

2.

The

plaintiff

is

awarded

$4,521.78

as

pre-

judgment interest on special damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-27-44.

This represents interest at 8% per annum on $17,250

from April 9, 1986 to July 19, 19893.

The

plaintiff

is awarded

judgment

against

the

defendants for general damages in the amount of $5,000.
4.
against

the

The plaintiff is awarded post-judgment
defendant

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Ann.

interest
§15-1-4,

consistent with this judgment, accruing at the rate of 12% per
annum.
5.

The plaintiff is awarded his costs of court in the

amount of $543.95.

i.ji

DATED thi

day of

FRANK G. NOEL
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

BRUCE R. GARNER
Attorney for the Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
EISENSTAEDT, ROBERT
PLAINTIFF
VS
SEARS ROEBUCK CO
OTIS ELEVATOR

CASE NUMBER 860909577 PI
DATE 09/28/89
HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK NP

DEFENDANT

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. JENSEN, GORDON K.
D. ATTY. BURTON, ROBERT A.

THE COURT HAS REVIEWED DEFTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
A REMITTITUR TOGETHER WITH THE MEMOS FILED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND NOW RULES AS FOLLOWS: IT IS NOT FOR THE COURT TO WEIGH
THE EVIDENCE NOR TO SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE JURY
ON FACTUAL ISSUES. THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THERE WAS
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON BOTH THE LIABILITY AND DAMAGE ISSUES UPON
WHICH THE JURY COULD BASE ITS VERDICT. FOR THAT REASON AND FOR
THE REASONS STATED IN PLTFS MEMO THE COURT DENIES DEFTS MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A REMITTITUR. COUNSEL FOR PLTF IS TO
PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THIS RULING AND SUBMIT IT TO
THE COURT FOR SIGNATURE.

.*ofc
iv:^

OCT 2 3 1989

GORDON K. JENSEN - A4351
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT EISENSTAEDT,
Plaintiff,

;i

ORDER

|
)
]I

Civil No. C860909577 PI

vs .
SEARS ROEBUCK CO. and
OTIS ELEVATOR,

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.

The defendant Otis Elevator's Motion for a New Trial
or,

in

Judgment

the

Alternative,

Notwithstanding

For

Remittitur

and

its

Motion

for

the Verdict or, in the Alternative,

New Trial came before the Court pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
of

the

parties,

pursuant

to

the

Based on the memoranda

Court's

Minute

Entry

of

September 28, 1989, and good cause appearing:
IT

IS

ORDERED

that

the

defendant

Otis

Elevator's

Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, For Remittitur and
its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the
Alternative, New Trial are denied.

DATED th is />Qday of O

<^>A y

, 19^8-.

HONORABLE FRANK G. NO
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to Form:
BROCE R. GARMEI
Attorney for JOtis Elevator

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the ~&$

day of October/ 1989, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER (Eisenstaedt v.
Sears, et al) was mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing a copy
of the same in the U.S. mail, to the following:
Bruce R. Garner
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorney for Defendant Otis Elevator Company
Key Bank Tower, 7th Floor
50 South Main Street
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT
84110
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